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The purpose of this paper is to consider an alternative to the logical positivist 
interpretation of Hume. A non-rationalist interpretation of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
is discussed as the context for Hume’s thought, putting the focus on his theory of 
human nature as the basis for science. By emphasising the limitations both of reason 
and of observation for understanding reality, Hume  showed how science could draw 
on other human faculties to provide a basis for action. Smith’s adaptation of Hume’s 
work in his philosophy of science and in his economics is discussed as further 
evidence that Hume’s thought can be interpreted as being incompatible with logical 
positivism.  
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David Hume has been characterised as laying the foundations for the 
development of logical positivism, by philosophers of science such as Rosenberg 
(1993), and by economists such as Fitzgibbons (1995). This characterisation of Hume 
(or at least Humean philosophy) is most consistently made by critical realists (see 
Lawson, 1997), following on the characterisation of Enlightenment philosophy made 
by the transcendental realist philosopher Bhaskar (1975).  
 Logical positivism is associated with the view that science consists solely of 
empirically-testable statements. As Ayer (1959: 14, emphasis in original) depicted the 
approach: 
‘First it is empiricist and positivist: there is knowledge only from 
experience, which rests on what is immediately given. This sets the 
limits for the context of legitimate science. Second, the scientific 
world-conception is marked by the application of a certain method, 
namely logical analysis. The aim of scientific effort is to reach the 
goal, unified science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical 
material.’ 
Hume was critical of idealism, claiming that knowledge arises only from experience, 
or ‘sensation’: 
‘When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what 
havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity 
or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any 
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and 
existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain 
nothing but sophistry and illusion.’       
   (Hume, EHU: 165, emphasis in original) 
Further, the way in which we use sensation in order to infer causal relations is by 
observing constant conjunctions of events: 
‘It follows, then, that all reasonings concerning cause and effect, are 
founded on experience, and that all reasonings from experience are 
founded on the supposition, that the course of nature will continue 
uniformly the same. We conclude, that like causes, in like 
circumstances, will always produce like effects.’ (Hume, TM: 651). 
Taken in isolation, these quotes provide evidence in support of the view that Hume 
did indeed provide inspiration for the development of logical positivism.  
Yet there is a growing philosophy literature now which questions the logical 
positivist reading of Hume (see for example Wright, 1983 and Strawson, 
1989); this work builds on the pivotal work of Norman Kemp Smith (1905a, 
1905b, 1941) which was the first modern statement of a non-positivist 
interpretation of Hume. It is the purpose of  this paper to reassess Hume along 
these lines particularly in relation to economics. This is compatible with some 
of the discussion of Hume arising from the Keynes’s philosophy literature (see 
Carabelli, 1988 and Meeks, 1991, for example). The discussion here extends 
to Smith, because of Hume’s undoubted influence on him, and because of 
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Smith’s influence in turn on the development of economics. Indeed, we will 
reconsider the philosophical contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment in 
general in relation to positivism. Such a reconsideration is of interest in itself, 
but is also important for the interpretation of Hume. In considering Hume’s 
context, we will draw on another reassessment: that of the nature of the 
Scottish Enlightenment as has emerged recently in the history literature (see 
for example Allan, 1993). While it had been conventional to treat key figures 
in the Scottish Enlightenment (and particularly Hume) in isolation from their 
intellectual context, the focus of the reassessment has been on the distinctive 
features of the Scottish Enlightenment, and its origins, which were a common 
influence on all who were part of that tradition. 
 In what follows, we outline the environment which shaped Hume, identifying 
key features which Hume shared and subsequently developed. We then consider 
Hume’s influence on Smith and the relation between Smith’s approach to economics 
and logical positivism. The conclusion is reached that, while the traditional 
interpretation of Hume was indeed an inspiration for logical positivism, another 
interpretation may be supported which suggests that Scottish Enlightenment thought 
in general, and that of Hume in particular, are incompatible with logical positivism. 
  
INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT 
The nature of the intellectual environment which shaped Hume and Smith has 
been a matter for dispute. The traditional view has been that the key figures of the 
Enlightenment period were an aberration in an otherwise backward economic and 
cultural environment. This view stems from influential Victorian historians such as 
Buckle, was reinforced by Trevor-Roper (1967) and was given authority more recently 
by Smout (1969, 1983). Lough (1985: 9) puts it in its most extreme form as follows:  
‘such Enlightenment as existed in eighteenth-century Scotland was 
confined to a tiny minority who lived surrounded by a narrow-
minded nationalism and bigoted puritanism which have survived in 
part down to our own day’.  
This view supports the interpretation of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers in the terms 
of other national Enlightenments, and can thus serve to explain why Hume and Smith 
have been misunderstood (in relation to what they may be said to have meant in terms 
of their own intellectual environment). 
 Yet this view of the Scottish Enlightenment is now seriously challenged by 
those who have placed it in the context of intellectual developments in Scotland which 
date back to the fifteenth century and can only be understood in terms of the political, 
religious, educational and cultural environment (see Davie, 1961, 1973; Broadie, 
1990; Allan, 1993; Beveridge and Turnbull, 1997). Considering Hume and Smith 
against this background suggests a very different interpretation of their philosophy of 
science from that which led to logical positivism. 
 Unlike England, the political environment in Scotland was one in which 
questions of jurisdiction and authority did not have clear answers, or clear means of 
establishing answers. It has been argued that, in medieval times, personal authority 
had played as much a part as birth in the royal succession. The union of the Scottish 
and English crowns in 1603 and the Act of Union in 1707 raised new questions about 
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royal succession, as well as questions about nationhood, legitimation and the 
relationship between church and state. Hume, it should be remembered, was writing 
around the time of two armed rebellions (in 1715 and 1745) which revolved around 
the question of the British royal succession. It has been argued that it is this context 
which nurtured the characteristic Scottish interest in metaphysics. As Sutherland 
(1982: 136, italics in original) points out: 
 ‘..the Scots are theologians and metaphysicians, for the origins of 
Scotland, as Knox and his collaborators helped to shape it, lie in part 
at least in metaphysical arguments about nationhood and 
legitimation. As such there was a peculiar Scottish need for 
systematic thought, the outcome of which was an unusually strong 
preoccupation with questions about the nature and scope of reason.’ 
 Scottish metaphysics had a strong historical focus. ‘History itself would 
become the means to defining and identifying the characteristics of the model social 
leader’ (Allan, 1993: 88). Calvinism had further encouraged the view that social 
leadership should be based on virtue rather than birth, and historical study indeed was 
seen by the Church as second only to scriptural study as a means of revealing God’s 
work. 
 Revelation of God’s work in turn can be understood as a process of learning 
about causation (see Beveridge and Turnbull, 1997). The purpose of learning was thus 
not scholastic, but practical, a means of promoting virtue at both individual and social 
levels. Nor was this learning to be the preserve of an elite. The Church promoted 
general primary education explicitly to promote general literacy in order to read 
scripture; it is estimated that reading literacy was almost universal, at least in the 
Lowlands, by the mid-eighteenth century (see Anderson, 1997). Those Enlightenment 
thinkers who questioned the authority of the Church nevertheless adopted a similar 
agenda, studying history in order to learn about causation with a view to promoting 
personal and social virtue, discussing the proper basis for identifying causation, and 
grappling with the same issues with respect to freedom and determination. While the 
traditional view of the Scottish Enlightenment saw it as a dualistic rejection of 
Calvinism, there is good reason to see it rather as a secular continuation from 
Calvinism. 
 Further, while Scottish Enlightenment thought did refer to issues raised 
elsewhere, notably by Mandeville, Hobbes and Locke, the moderate scepticism of 
Scottish metaphysics was already well-established in the stream of common sense 
philosophy which could be traced back at least to John Mair in the early sixteenth 
century. Common sense philosophy originated in the Aristotelian tradition. It saw the 
possibility of transcendent knowledge arising, not from individual senses, but from 
the operation of all senses in conjunction.  According to the seminal statement by 
Dugald Stewart (1915: 231-2), this transcendent knowledge allowed the identification 
of causal laws, where most outcomes are in fact the result of a combination of causes. 
The philosophy is founded on a belief in existence as a metaphysical or transcendent 
truth whose pragmatic adoption could be justified in the same way as we justify 
adoption of mathematical axioms.  
 Also stemming from Aristotle was the tradition of natural law philosophy, 
referring to an underlying order in natural phenomena (see O’Brien, 1975: 22). In 
Scotland, the natural law approach was applied also to jurisprudence and to morals. 
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While Calvinism provided a theological basis for belief in natural law, Enlightenment 
thinkers, under the lead of Hutcheson, attempted to provide an empirical basis for that 
belief. Hume was notable for denying the possibility of empirically proving a divine 
origin for natural law, and thus for aiming to establish instead a purely secular natural 
law on an empirical footing (see Forbes, 1975: 61). But Hume was not sanguine about 
the existence of natural laws. The application of natural law to jurisprudence and 
morals implied that an underlying social order was not assured, ie that action was 
required to ensure order:  
‘discovery of natural laws,.. if followed, lead to the best possible 
situation; ... positive legislation should reflect these natural laws’  
      (O’Brien, 1975: 22). 
 It is worth emphasising the importance of practical reason for the Scottish 
Enlightenment. While Bhaskar (1975), for example, emphasises the epistemological 
character of Scottish Enlightenment thought, the underlying purpose was action (both 
individual and social), in terms of virtue, in terms of politics and in terms of science. 
The historical foundation for all knowledge, further, laid emphasis on change and 
evolution, and the possibility of action to transform that evolution. As Macfie (1990: 
12) puts it: 
‘[t]he central assumptions of Benthamite Utilitarianism are 
themselves antithetic to the whole spirit of the Scottish social school. 
The main philosophic contrast is between a mechanistic psychology, 
which inevitably eliminates any truly moral theory, and the 
optimistic forward-looking assumptions of the Scottish school; or 
again it is seen in the fact that the Scots saw the central fact as a 
growing society, a creature quite different from any mere individual, 
whereas to Bentham any society was merely an aggregate of 
individuals.’ 
 At the heart of the Scottish Enlightenment, therefore, was a theory of human 
nature, where individuals were seen as social beings (Wokler, 1988: 146). With some 
exceptions, the predominant view was that there is a uniformity to human nature, 
although that uniformity is manifested differently in different contexts. This issue was 
of immediate significance, in terms of how the native North Americans should be 
viewed, in terms of the attitude to slavery and, closer to home, the attitude of the 
Hanoverian officers in the aftermath of the 1745 rebellion which suggested that ‘they 
regarded the Scots in general as an inferior race, and the Highlanders in particular as 
benighted savages’ (Beveridge and Turnbull, 1997: 75). 
 This intellectual background for the Scottish Enlightenment can thus be seen 
to have various features not normally associated with logical positivism: a grounding 
in history; history understood as an open system; knowledge understood as an open 
system and as a social product; the purpose of knowledge being action; a 
consciousness of the distinction between ontology and epistemology. It is against this 
background that we now consider the contribution of David Hume. 
 
DAVID HUME 
Hume was one of the key figures in Scottish Enlightenment philosophy (along with 
Hutcheson and Smith), publishing his Treatise on Human Nature in  1739-40 (THN), 
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his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748 (EHU) and his Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals in 1751 (hereafter EPM), as well as numerous 
essays, some addressing economic subjects. He is best known for his scepticism, and 
his empiricism, both of which have been taken by many to lay the groundwork for 
logical positivism. We examine this claim in this section. It should be pointed out at 
this stage that Hume’s work is large and complex and, as with all great thinkers, 
involves contradictions. It is therefore not at all surprising that there should be several 
competing interpretations of  Hume. At the very least, the aim here is to demonstrate 
that the interpretation of Hume as the father of logical positivism is only one possible 
interpretation. The alternative interpretation offered here is put forward as making 
more sense in terms of the interpretation of Hume’s context offered in the previous 
section. 
 First, Hume took the distinction between ontology and epistemology seriously. 
He argued that neither existence nor causation could be established by means of 
reason:  
‘there is nothing like a proof concerning our rational notions of 
ourselves and of the world outside. We have experience, but 
experience only suffices to give us factuality, not necessity. It 
therefore restricts our knowledge to things experienced, excluding us 
from any knowledge of things to come.’  (Luthe, 1984: 110)  
Nevertheless, Hume proceeded on the basis of belief in existence, in an echo of 
common sense philosophy:  
‘We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence 
of body? but ‘tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a 
point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings’  
   (Hume, THN: 187, emphasis in original).  
 While for some, Hume’s scepticism about the scope of reason and observation 
is seen as destructive, Hume did not see it as impeding science. Rather he saw himself 
‘clearing the ground for science’ by specifying the proper scope for knowledge.  
‘If we had only reason and the senses, the faculties championed by 
previous philosophers, we would be mired in a debilitating and 
destructive uncertainty. So unfortunate an outcome is avoided only 
by the operation of that apparently unreliable third faculty, the 
imagination. It, by means of what appear to be a series of outright 
mistakes and trivial suggestions, leads us to believe in our own 
selves and in independently existing objects. The scepticism of the 
philosophers is in this way confirmed...and shown to be of no 
practical import.’  (Norton, 1993: 11, emphasis in original).  
Indeed, in a volume devoted to making the case that Hume is a sceptical realist, 
Wright (1983: 27) argues that Hume suggested that human nature made scepticism 
unsustainable in practice, whatever its force in logic. 
 Rather than dismissing the imagination as unscientific, Hume welcomes it as 
providing scope for science. Elsewhere, he talks of the gap left by sensation and 
reason being filled by the passions, sentiment, habit or convention, or by judgement 
(Hume, THN: 183). Indeed, Hume (THN: 415) sees ‘the passions’ as being prior to 
reason. It is convention, he argues, not reason or sensation, which provides the basis 
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for natural law. Further, it is the science of man which provides the ‘basis for all our 
knowledge - including logical and mathematical knowledge and the knowledge of the 
natural sciences’ (Luthe, 1984: 113-4, emphasis in original). Far from being 
concerned to base science purely on reason, Hume aimed to show the limitations ot 
reason and the need to start with sentiment, without which science could not proceed. 
As Hume (THN: xv) himself put it:  
‘Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human 
nature; and that however wide any of them may run from it, they still return 
back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and 
Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; 
since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers 
and faculties.’ (emphasis in original). 
 For all Hume emphasised the underlying uniformity of man, his approach was 
non-axiomatic.  
‘If Hume did argue that the principles of human nature were constant, he also 
appreciated that the way in which men behaved would be profoundly affected 
by the socio-economic environment which might happen to exist; by changes 
in habits, customs and manners. By the same token Hume also wished to make 
the point that certain economic relationships would be affected by these 
factors’    (Skinner, 1994: 35, emphasis in original).  
Further, Hume (EPM: Appendix II) explicitly rejected the idea that the moral 
sentiment which determined behaviour could all be reduced to narrow self-interest, 
thus ruling out one particular avenue for axiomatising human behaviour. Indeed, 
Hume’s overall system was not axiomatic. While the starting-point was a belief in 
existence, this was only a working hypothesis, as was the belief that nature was 
uniform (Hendel, 1955: xxii-xxiii). 
 Hume posed his system in opposition to the idealists who derived results 
deductively from axioms, which Hume referred to as ‘fictions’. He explicitly 
distinguished fiction from belief in that the latter is based on involuntary sentiment, 
arising from experience in general and the particularities of the situation (EHU: 48). 
Hume emphasised the importance of empirical evidence (derived from ‘sensation’), 
even though observation could not reveal causation. This was his problem of 
induction, that causation, even though it existed independently of the mind, could not 
be understood independently of the mind, and could therefore not be fully understood:  
‘If we have really no idea of a power or efficacy in any object, or of any real 
connexion betwixt causes and effects, ‘twill be to little purpose to prove, that 
an efficacy is necessary in all operations. We do not understand our own 
meaning in talking so, but ignorantly confound ideas, which are entirely 
distinct from each other. I am indeed ready to allow, that there may be several 
qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly 
unacquainted; and if we please to call these power and efficacy, ‘twill be of 
little consequence to the world. But when, instead of meaning these unknown 
qualities, we make the terms of power and efficacy signify something, of 
which we have a clear idea, and which is incompatible with those objects, to 
which we apply it, obscurity and error begin then to take place, and we are led 
astray by a false philosophy. This is the case, when we transfer the 
determination of the thought to external objects, and suppose any real 
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intelligible connexion betwixt them; that being a quality, which can only 
belong to the mind that considers them.’ 
     (Hume, THN: 12, emphasis in original). 
Hume proceeds to argue that the only reasonable basis for the idea of causal power is 
the sensation of constant conjunction of events (even thought that cannot capture real 
cause). The argument is elaborated in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
where Hume further explores the concept of power (in section VII). He argues against 
the practice of ascribing power to some invisible source such as the deity, and 
promotes the limitation of science to inference of power from sensations of cause and 
effect.  
 It is easy to see from these passages, and those surrounding them, why Hume 
should be interpreted as directing social science towards an empirical method based 
on statistical correlation. But considering Hume’s argument further in its context 
suggests an alternative interpretation. Hume was arguing against the use of a priori 
reasoning and the appeal to an unobservable power. He was arguing further against 
unthinking analogy between causal power as perceived in the mind and real causal 
power. Real causal power itself cannot be observed (and this applies to the workings 
of the mind, just as to external phenomena, see Hume, EHU: 14). The influence of 
natural law philosophy is evident in Hume’s belief that there are underlying causal 
forces. As Kemp Smith (1941:  94, emphasis in original) put it: 
 ‘Thus in all instances of causation.... what we 
contemplate is at most uniformity of sequence; in all cases what 
we yet also experience is a feeling in terms of which we are 
enabled, and constrained, to believe in what we yet never 
comprehend, the occurrence of causal happenings, and so to 
believe in what we variously entitle ‘necessary connexion’, 
‘power’, ‘force’, ‘energy’. 
 This teaching, which is so central in Hume’s philosophy, 
allows of statement in other terms. If we study the causal relation 
not directly but in the propositions in which it is asserted, we find 
that they have no cognitive or theoretical certainty. Neither 
reason nor evidence can be cited in their support. Their certainty 
is not that of insight in any form, but exclusively of belief - an 
attitude of mind which is explicable solely by reference to the de 
facto constitution of our human nature.’  
Sensations give us the best opportunity of developing the idea of causal 
power, supporting belief in their existence. We can never know (or know 
that we know) real powers; our best chance is to employ observation. 
‘It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce 
the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater 
simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few 
general causes, by means of reasoning from analogy, experience, and 
observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should 
in vain attempt their discovery...These ultimate springs and 
principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and 
enquiry....The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only 
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staves off our ignorance a liitle longer; as perhaps the most perfect 
philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover 
larger portions of it.’ (Hume, EHU: 30-1). 
 Further, while Hume argued that the idea of cause could be inferred from 
observed constant conjunction of events, this does not in practice support the 
statistical correlation approach. Hume employed simple ‘event’ examples, but this did 
not mean that he was referring exclusively to predictions within given structures, or 
that there could be any presumption that cause and effect would be replicated in the 
future, ie there was no presumption that, in reality, the extrinsic or intrinsic conditions 
for closure were satisfied. Indeed the problem of induction is addressed precisely to 
this issue. Hume explicitly contrasts the demonstrative nature of reasoning concerning 
the relation of ideas with moral reasoning, concerning fact and existence: 
‘that there are no demonstrative arguments in the [latter] case seems 
evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature 
may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have 
experienced, may be attended with different and contrary effects’  
      (Hume, EHU: 35).  
Thus, in a discussion of Hume’s philosophy in relation to Mackie (1965, 1980), 
Drakopoulos and Torrance (1994: 179) conclude (see also Wright, 1983: 26 and 
Strawson, 1989):  
‘On this view of causality ... causal explanations emphatically do not 
usually refer to visible surface regularities of the sort ‘an event of 
kind F is invariably followed by an event of kind P’. More 
commonly, explanations will refer to deeply-embedded bundles of 
interacting causal principles, and will thus have to take serious 
account of the overall environmental setting in which each particular 
state of affairs to be explained is actually situated.’  
 This interpretation is supported by a study of Hume’s other writings, including 
his own contributions to economics. In the Scottish tradition, his approach was 
historical, emphasising the particularities of circumstances. Hume indeed is a historian 
as much as a philosopher, perhaps his most noted work being The History of England, 
in which he demonstrated the evolution of the governmental system in England as the 
result of a range of real tendencies rather than human artifice (see Skinner, 1993).  In 
economics, Hume is best-known for his early statement of the Quantity Theory of 
Money. But here too Hume’s method was historical, human sentiment being central, 
so that the Quantity Theory referred to only one of several operative tendencies. For 
example, while discussing the determination of the rate of interest (see also 
Hutchison, 1990: 42): 
 ‘Hume thus concluded that the most important single factor was not 
simply the supply of money, but a change in manners and in the form 
of economic organisation....The technique just considered counsels 
caution in offering generalisations in economics’  
     (Skinner, 1993: 237-8;).  
Further, in addition to his static statement of the Quantity Theory of Money, Hume 
argued for increasing the money supply to encourage entrepreneurship and increase 
productivity.  
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‘Hume was seeking to show that the frequently posed question as to 
what was the ‘right’ quantity of money for a country was, in the long 
run [in the abstract sense], meaningless’  (Hutchison, 1990: 45). 
 Hume’s resistance to idealist argument stems from his objection to incorrect 
use of analogy (see Sutherland, 1982). Hume used negative analogy to great effect, as 
a mechanism for identifying regularity from a series of sensations. (We recognise the 
category ‘egg’ as a result of observing a variety of types of egg.) But he objected 
profoundly to analogies between different levels (ontological, epistemological and 
divine). His argument against rational belief in God was based on the argument that 
belief in the divine cannot be justified in terms of an analogy with the human. His 
argument against a priori reasoning was based on the argument that a priori 
identification of causal power cannot be justified in terms of analogy between ideas 
and the real. Hume thereby avoids the epistemic fallacy, as it is identified by Bhaskar. 
Belief in God, and belief in the real, rely on sentiment, not on pure reason. 
 It is in the context of the prior role of sentiment that Hume poses the 
normative/positive distinction, arguing that others had not used it properly. According 
to Forbes’s (1977: 47-8) interpretation, in the absence of demonstrative proof of 
positive statements, normative statements have priority. Since imagination and 
sentiment are prior to and necessary for knowledge, then all knowledge is conditioned 
by normative statements. Hume’s purpose in drawing attention to the distinction was 
to make clear that those, such as Hutcheson, who were attempting to derive natural 
law from observation were implicitly engaging in a normative exercise. Hume’s 
empiricism, in contrast, rested explicitly on normative judgement. Thus, rather than 
arguing that science should eradicate normative judgement, Hume simply argued for 




Smith, like Hume, has been subject to different interpretations. In particular, the 
conventional interpretation stemming from a rationalist perspective has treated 
Smith’s economics in isolation from his philosophy, and has seen him as the 
inspiration for the building of a complete, closed, axiomatic, general equilibrium 
system. But interpretations which have considered Smith’s work in its entirety and 
have placed it in the context of eighteenth-century Scotland suggest that there is little 
basis for this interpretation (see Winch, 1997). We shall consider Smith in this latter 
sense, which is compatible with our interpretation of Hume. But, rather than 
considering Smith’s legacy for the content and method of economic theory, we focus 
here on his methodology in relation to the subsequent development of logical 
positivism. 
 There can be no question that Hume was a direct influence on Smith (see 
Raphael, 1977), nor that both were subject to common influences, notably Francis 
Hutcheson, and that both were responding to the needs of the day which philosophy 
and economics were attempting to address: providing a foundation for ethics and 
science, and policy with respect to the changing economic environment. Smith did not 
share Reid and Beattie’s interpretation of Hume as a destructive philosopher; Smith 
adopted key features of Hume’s thought and developed it further in his theory of 
science, in his theory of moral sentiments and his economics. It is our purpose here to 
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argue for an interpretation of Smith, such that he held in common with Hume an 
approach to science which is not compatible with logical positivsm. 
 Smith adopted Hume’s view that ideas have their origin in observation, but 
that ideas may then be developed in the mind (Fitzgibbons, 1995: 197-8). Smith made 
no particular contribution to the question of the existence of the real, other perhaps 
than in considering the relationship between the real and language (as well as the 
more conventional real and sensation, see Wightman, 1980: 133-4). But, while Hume 
had introduced the notion of the imagination or sentiment as supplying common sense 
belief in the real, Smith developed the notion of imagination or sentiment as supplying 
the very motivation for pursuing the idea of causation. In his History of Astronomy 
(hereafter HA), Smith explained the psychological  motivation for science in terms of 
the sentiments of wonder, surprise and admiration. Unexplained phenomena excite 
wonder, which encourages the development of theories. We then admire theories 
which order our understanding of apparently chaotic phenomena in terms of familiar 
concepts, and we are motivated then to change those theories if surprised by 
discordant appearances. 
‘Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of 
nature....Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains which bind 
together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order 
into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this 
tumult of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great 
revolutions of the universe, to that tone of tranquillity and 
composure, which is most agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its 
nature. Philosophy, therefore, may be regarded as one of those arts 
which address themselves to the imagination.’   
(Smith, HA: 45-6)  
Thus, Smith grounds science in observation, although clearly distinguishing the 
psychological process of science from the real; but science evolves by reference back 
to the real and attempts to adjust knowledge to take account of contrary observations. 
Smith thus carries forward Hume’s understanding of the distinction between the 
ontological and the epistemological, while adopting the common sense belief in the 
existence of the real: 
‘Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little 
system, created to perform, as well as to connect together, in reality, 
those different movements and effects which the artist has occasion 
for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together 
in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already 
in reality performed.’     (Smith, HA: 66) 
Smith thus developed Hume’s notion of theories as being an attempt to overcome the 
limits to reason. Smith’s discussion in the Astronomy of four approaches to the subject 
illustrates the view that no one true theory is knowable, and sentiment will determine 
which is preferred. Smith (HA, 105) notes the temptation to regard theories as true, 
notably Newton’s theory of gravity, although it is only a construct of the mind which 
other generations may choose to reject. Smith’s notion of belief in imaginary systems 
is offered in the same way as Hume’s common sense belief in the existence of real 
things. 
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 Smith was an admirer of Newton’s system of astronomy, and aspired to build a 
system of political economy. But his historical approach meant that the system had to 
be treated as open, concentrating on processes (where these processes need not lead to 
equilibrium) rather than equilibrium states; this differs from what we now know as a 
general equilibrium system (see Skinner, 1996: chapter 5). While Hume’s open-
system approach stemmed explicitly from our inability to identify the real underlying 
systemic processes (the real system could be closed, but we could not identify it as 
such), Smith’s open system approach stemmed explicitly from his observation of 
social and economic behaviour. 
 Smith, like Hume, embeds his philosophy and economics in a theory of human 
nature. He refers to mankind as having common motivations; philosophy, for 
example, only differs from other modes of enquiry through the education and 
diligence of those who become philosophers. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(hereafter TMS), Smith develops the Humean notion of sympathy to portray man as a 
social being, belying the popular interpretation of Smith whereby self-interest is 
understood as selfishness. Further, just as scientific theories cannot be regarded as 
true, so self-delusion is a general possibility. Smith  (TMS: 181) focuses particularly 
on the delusion that riches promote happiness, although this has the positive by-
product of promoting entrepreneurship and thus economic growth.  
 This is one of many examples in Smith of unintended consequences, which 
together are understood as the operation of the Invisible Hand. Smith used this 
concept primarily in the Theory of Moral Sentiments to refer to the role of sentiments, 
particularly in the form of sympathy, in taming individual behaviour; moral 
judgements might be made not only on the basis of sympathy with other humans, but 
also on the basis of sympathy with an impartial observer (either imagined, or in the 
form of the deity).  As far as the economic system is concerned, intentional behaviour 
is addressed to self-interest (although that self-interest has to be understood in social 
terms), but has the unintended consequence of systemic coordination. For the 
individual the consequence is uncertainty (see Skinner, 1972; 1996: chapter 5). Smith 
explicitly rejected utilitarian representations of human nature because it could not 
address man’s social nature (see Smith, TMS: 192-3). 
 Smith was, like Hume, an empiricist in the sense that theory was prompted by 
and was referred back to observation. This was intrinsic to the historical method. 
Smith also carried forward Hume’s view of causality in terms of observation of 
contiguity (HA, 40-41). Smith argued that theories were psychologically satisfying if 
they could simplify reality according to a chain of reasoning from a few principles. 
And yet he saw these principles as working hypotheses, to be checked against 
observation, rather than axioms. Smith thus shared Hume’s dislike of a priori 
axiomatic systems. While theories could not be said to be true, Smith could identify 
lack of truth, and he did so with reference to the a priori reasoning of Descartes, in his 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (hereafter LRBL) : 
‘It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the 
most unaccountable as deduced from some principle (commonly a 
wellknown one) and all united in one chain.....We need not be 
surprised then that the Cartesian Philosophy....tho it does not perhaps 
contain a word of truth....should nevertheless have been so 
universally received by all the Learned in Europe at that time. The 
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Great Superiority of the method over that of Aristotle....made them 
greedily receive a work which we justly esteem one of the most 
entertaining Romances that has ever been wrote.’  
(Smith, LRBL: 146) 
Smith argues that theories are more readily accepted the more they draw on principles 
already widely-held. But it was easier for mathematics and the natural sciences than 
for poetry to develop principles independent of popular sentiment (Smith, TMS: 124-
5). This allowed mathematics and natural science to be more free of reverence for the 
past than subjects more in the public domain (see Wightman, 1980: 14-5), which 
would include the social sciences; but there is also the implication that, the more 
removed are subjects from the public domain, the greater the latitude they have to be 
protected from confrontation with contrary evidence. 
 The importance of grounding in observation for Smith is clearly evident from 
his writing in economics, notably his Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (hereafter WN). Here we see an example of the historical method 
being employed in order to tease out a theory about the generative mechanisms of the 
economic system. Smith focused on human sentiment toward betterment, and the 
process of the division of labour, as key elements of that process. The historical 
approach emphasised how, in particular, human sentiment is manifested differently in 
different contexts. As the theory evolves from the historical analysis, it is checked 
back against further historical instances.  
 This in turn created a vision of the economic process, which might be regarded 
as transcendent. Smith saw capitalism developing by means of the division of labour, 
spurred on by (socially-grounded) self-interest. But the unintended consequences were 
not all beneficial. In particular, Smith was concerned about a tendency towards 
monopoly which would subvert capitalism’s capacity to meet individual needs, and 
about the tendency of factory production processes to create working conditions 
which, in comparison with more primitive societies, promote moral decay. In other 
words, following in the tradition of Scottish common sense philosophy, Smith did not 
see wealth and virtue as necessarily being jointly-promoted by capitalism. Rather 
Smith’s theory provided the justification for action to promote virtue, such as 
enhanced provision of education. Heilbroner (1986: 155) denies that Smith achieved 
theoretical transcendence; certainly he did not in the sense that Marx did. But the 
transcendent vision was one of an open, evolving system, without any fixed end-point 
to the operation of its tendencies, but rather a basis for policy action depending on the 
strength of the various tendencies. Certainly others have criticised Smith for not 
digging deep enough for his generative mechanisms; John Rae in particular argued 
that the division of labour itself required explanation. But Smith’s aim was to identify 
generative mechanisms, even if he fell short of his aim (see Dow et al, 1998). 
  
CONCLUSION 
We have attempted here to develop the argument that Hume’s philosophy of science 
can reasonably be understood to be incompatible with logical positivism. The 
argument took account of Hume’s intellectual background, and also considered the 
implications of his philosophy of science as developed in the work of Smith which 
was apparently inspired by Hume.  
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 Central to both Hume and Smith’s philosophy was a theory of human nature, 
where humans are social, and where human conventions vary with historical context. 
Further, human behaviour is governed significantly by factors other than reason - 
imagination, passion, sentiment, judgement, and convention - because reason does not 
provide an adequate basis for knowledge or action. Logical positivism constrains 
science to the applciation of logical analysis to empirical material. But, for all Hume’s 
emphasis on observation (as a counterpoint to idealism), his central argument, 
according to this re-assessment, referred to the inadequacy of both reason and 
observation for science; science could only proceed on the foundation of the other 
human faculties. Thus liberated from the limits to reason and to observation, science 
could be addressed to action in an evolving social environment where the operation of 
natural law was continually tempered by the particularities of context.  
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